In this paper we set up a simple real option model of retail shopping center leases. The model incorporates the effects of stochastic sales externalities and the possibility of tenant default. The model sheds new light on a number of puzzles: Why a Jorgensonian user cost of capital may overestimate shopping center values. Why retail tenants pay their landlord a percentage of revenue (above a sales breakpoint) in addition to a traditional fixed rent. Why an increase in sales volatility may reduce, rather than increase, the value of a shopping center. Why base and percentage rents may move positively together, and not negatively as others have suggested. Why retail property capitalization rates and interest rates can be negatively, as opposed to positively, related with each other. And: Why leases with a percentage of sales rental are often given little or no value for purposes of financing by lenders, regardless of whether or not the tenant is a national chain with substantial net worth.
Introduction
The pricing of retail leases has especially received attention in studies by Sirmans (1990, 1992) , Brueckner (1993) , Colwell and Nunneke (1998) , Pashigian and Gould (1998) , and Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast (2005) , and by Grenadier (1995 Grenadier ( , 1996 , Hendershott and Ward (2000, 2002) , Moordian and Yang (2000) , Clapham (2003) , and Benjamin and Chinloy (2004) . The studies by Sirmans (1990, 1992 ), Brueckner (1993), Colwell and Nunneke (1998) , Pashigian and Gould (1998) , and Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast (2005) discuss the pricing of retail leases in a deterministic framework in which consumers are drawn to shop at the center by the reputation and advertising of the major retailer. These models have problems, however, in valuing percentage of sales rentals, rent bumps, expense stops, etc.
The studies by Grenadier (1995 Grenadier ( , 1996 , Ward (2000, 2002) , Mooradian and Yang (2000), Clapham (2003) , and Benjamin and Chinloy (2004) , on the other hand, discuss the pricing of retail leases in a framework in which sales follow a stochastic process.
In these models, feedback effects, such as the loss of a major tenant (or a decline in the tenant's customer drawing power) on sales, the center's occupancy rate, and rent levels of the other tenants, are generally ignored. Therefore, these models systematically underestimate risk and overestimate value when default is an important element in the analysis.
The present study integrates these two lines of research. The model developed here treats the stochastic component of store sales in a manner similar to Ward (2000, 2002) , and shared and generative business within the shopping center in a manner similar to Brueckner (1993) . Additionally, the model allows for any tenant of any size to default, and for default of a key anchor tenant under the lease agreement to lead to further defaults by other tenants.
We assume tenants have a claim on all future profits (modeled as a stochastic process) and the market value of the center represents the expectation of these cash flows discounted at a constant risk-adjusted discount rate. Tenants are price-takers in the leasing market, competing with many other tenants in a perfectly competitive market. Rental prices are fixed for the term of the lease at lease commencement. These rental prices vary by type of tenant so as to take into account customer-drawing ability. The single optimization problem is for the tenant to determine when to exercise his or her default option.
The solution to the model follows by applying stochastic dynamic programming. The analysis is performed on a lease by lease basis. The results are summed across all leases to obtain the market value of the center. Different sets of simulation are then carried out to examine the comparative statics of the model and study the impact of shifts in rental rates and the level of return on valuation.
Several new results emerge. One, the usual certainty theory for measuring the user cost of a retail lease as the sum of the expected risk-adjusted discount rate, plus the depreciation incurred and minus the rate of asset price change no longer applies. The user cost also needs to include a risk premium to compensate the owner/tenant for the risk that the sales externality effects at the center could dissipate or disappear over time. Two, and somewhat related, ignoring this risk premium may significantly overestimate shopping center value. Three, the greater the expected volatility in sales, the less valuable is the lease contract to the owner.
Others have suggested that the more uncertain the sales, the greater the value of the shopping center. Four, base and percentage rents in our model may move positively together, and not negatively as others have suggested. Five, retail property capitalization rates and interest rates can be negatively, as opposed to positively, related with each other (as we shall show below). Six, the model reveals a perhaps somewhat latent role for percentage of sales rentals: namely, to offset the negative value to center owners of the tenant's option to cease to operate at the center or, at worst, to default.
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But this is not all. The model also helps to explain why leases with a percentage of sales rental are often given little or no value for purposes of financing by lenders. If the role of percentage of sales rentals is, in fact, to offset the negative value to center owners of the tenant's option to default, this would mean that percentage rents and tenant defaults would not have to be taken into account in the valuation, as long as the default-free lease cash flows were discounted at the risk-adjusted rate of return.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The paper first develops a model for the pricing of retail leases that depends on thirteen parameters, one of those being the extent to which individual tenants take advantage of one another as to confer benefits on one another. The paper then describes the initial parameterization of the model. Next, we present a discussion of the simulation results, followed then by conclusions.
Model Setup
There are n different tenants at the shopping center. Each tenant signs a (long-term) lease with a fixed base rent, and a percentage rent clause. Tenants let space at the center at time t = 0 and remain there until default; there are no tenant default costs. This assumes all leases 1 Compare this to Benjamin, Boyle, and Sirmans (1990), and Brueckner (1993) : who argue that percentage rents serve as a mechanism to shift risk from susceptible tenants to landlords who can better handle risk; however, for this to happen the optimal contract needs to be in the form of a pure percentage rent and cannot have a fixed rent component (see Lee (1995) ). Miceli and Sirmans(1995) offer a substantially different account, in which percentage lease agreements are used to coordinate the behaviors of multiple interdependent tenants through a common agent, the shopping center owner. Wheaton (2000) , and Riddiough and Williams (2005) argue that percentage lease agreements are used to align the interest of the shopping center owner with that of the tenants.
have a co-tenancy or kick-out clause, which allows tenants at the center to default without further cost if one of the anchor tenants at the center defaults or ceases to operate, or if sales should fall below a certain level.
2 Formally, we let S i (t) stand for sales per square foot for tenant i. Sales are produced with the help of two factors, the amount of space that is occupied by tenant i and the amount of space allocated to the other tenants, according to the constant-elasticity production function
We use Q i and Q j to denote the amount of space occupied by tenants i and j, respectively. The elasticities of production are λ i and γ ji , where λ i < 0 and γ ji is either negative or positive. For example, a higher Q i (t) means a lower S i (t), and a higher Q j (t) means a higher S i (t), on condition, obviously, that tenant j confers a positive externality on tenant i. Should γ ji = 0, tenant j would confer no externality on tenant i and, should γ ji be negative, tenant j would generate a negative externality. We use the following notation, X i , to denote demand shocks (i.e., something that causes a shift in the production function). We assume X i (t) is an event that evolves as a geometric Brownian
, where µ i is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in X i per unit time, σ i is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit time, and dZ i (t) represents the increments of a standard Weiner process.
We use the notation, D i (t), to account for normal depreciation. We assume that D i (t) follows the deterministic function dD i (t) = −θ i D i (t)dt and D i (0) = 1, where θ i is the economic rate of depreciation applied to D i (t).
In certain parts of the paper (for comparison purposes) we will focus on three different 2 The one sure way for sales at the center to fall below a certain level is for one of the anchor tenants to default (see Gatzlaff, Sirmans, and Diskin (1994) ). However, there are many other variables to consider and this is not the only way that center sales can fall. For example, center sales can fall, and fall hard, if the center finds itself being anchored by the number 3, 4, or 5 grocer in the market and losing market share to Wal-Mart, or if the center finds itself being anchored by an all-around department store and losing market share to "category killers" like Home Depot, Toy-R-Us, or Circuit City.
lease contracts: a pure fixed rent contract, a profit share rent contract (where the tenant pays nothing but percentage rent), and a percentage rent contract (where the tenant pays a base rent plus an overage rent, giving the center owner higher annual rents in years when tenant sales are particularly strong). For that purpose, we provide here the definitions of these (i) a pure fixed rent contract is given by P a i (t) = α i for all sales, where α equals a fixed base rent.
(ii) a profit share rent contract is given by
, where β i is an overage rate, and β i S i (t) can be viewed as an incentive payment to the center owner.
(iii) a percentage rent contract is given by We assume (for computational simplicity) that all other operating costs (e.g., property charges such taxed, insurance, and maintenance) are zero.
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The approach in the paper is to perform a lease by lease analysis to estimate the dollar value of each lease. We then sum across all leases to obtain the market value of the center.
We assume that the center owner is the developer and landlord. We assume that the center owner has already decided the amount of investment and the optimal tenant mix at the center. Also, the center owner has decided on α i , β i ,S i . We assume that these contract terms are set in a competitive market. Tenants choose when (and whether at all) to exercise the option to leave the center.
Value of a Pure Fixed Rent Contract
We can compute the present value of a pure fixed rent contract as follows.
) be tenant i's profit function (in present value terms). This value function is just the expected (discounted) value of all future profits, i.e.,
where
. . , Q n } and r i is a constant risk-adjusted discount rate -constant because risk is assumed to be unchanging during the life of the lease, and risk-adjusted because we assume X i (t) grows at µ i rather than at a risk-neutral rate. The infinite time horizon structure in (1) implies that there need not be a definite date when the tenant must cease to operate or elect to default.
The problem is to choose a boundary where tenant i is free to terminate its lease (without further cost) in order to maximize (1) . We define the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation by
That is, the return on investment,
, plus the expected rate of capital gain,
dt . Then using Ito's lemma we can write
where V X is the first derivative of V with respect to X i , V XX is the second derivative of V with respect to X i , V D is the first derivative of V with respect to D i , and p ji is given by
Here p ji represents the expected change in V (Q i , Q −i , X i , D i ) due to the possible exit of tenant j from the mall (which could occur when tenant j's retail sales fall below some critical level). p ji has two components: the expected loss if tenant j defaults, V Qj , and the probability that default will occur, dQj dt .
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The general solution to (3) is
where 
4 Reasonable parameter values are: V Q j = 0.25 (from Gatzlaff, Sirmans and Diskin (1994) , who conclude that non-anchor tenant rents decline by an estimated 25% after the loss of a major tenant) and dQ j dt = 0.03 to 0.04 (from our simulation analysis). This suggests a value of p ji in the 0.0075 to 0.0100 range.
This condition is easy to interpret. It equates the value of the default option to the certain recovery value.
The smooth-pasting condition is
This condition ensures that the function relating the default option to the certain recovery value at the point of default has zero slope.
The value function that satisfies these two conditions is
Equation (8) has an intuitive interpretation. The first term on the RHS of (8) The other two terms on the RHS of (8) represent the expected discounted value of sales and the rental flow, respectively. These two terms are discounted at different rates, the first term is discounted at r i + θ i − µ i + p i (since sales are assumed to grow (net of depreciation)
geometrically at µ i − θ i ), and the second term is discounted at
fixed for all sales).
The novelty in this formulation is the risk premium term, p i . When tenant j confers no externality on tenant i, and vice versa, the term p i disappears (i.e., V Qj = 0 in equation (4)), and the discount rate for the cash flows simply becomes r i + θ i , which is identical to the wellknown Jorgensonian user cost of capital used by Grenadier (1995 Grenadier ( , 1996 and others to value retail leases. The opposite conclusion holds when tenant i and j confer a positive externality on each other (i.e., when V Qj > 0), assuming, of course, dQj dt > 0. In this case, the term p i is needed to compensate the center owner/tenant for the risk that the sales externality effects at the center (however large) might become negative. We will come back to this point later in detail.
Value of a Profit Share Rent Contract
The problem is exactly as before: to maximize
tenant i must choose when (and whether at all) to exercise its option to exit the center. The only difference in this model than in the one above is that the tenant pays a base rent α i plus a profit share payment equal to equal to a certain fraction, β i , of sales,S i .
The point at which the value function
As we see, the terms on the RHS of (10) are well-defined and can be interpreted as follows.
is the value of the tenant's default option. Second,
is the expected discounted value of rents. Mathematically, these results follow from
Value of a Percentage Rent Contract
Now we turn to an analysis of percentage rent contracts. The model in outline form is as
We need to determine two value functions; a value function describing the value of the lease when S i (t) ≤S i , which we denote as V A (Q i , Y i ), and a value describing the value of the lease
These two value functions are given by
and
As part of the smooth-pasting condition we will need the expression for
, where Y * * * i andȲ i are critical points of default. Both value functions must also satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
At the sales threshold level,S i , the value matching condition requires
To ensure continuity when sales cross the threshold level the smooth-pasting con-
, and takes another form
This insight has important implications. When S i (t) ≤S i there are four components to
, which is the value of the tenant's default option;
, which is the center owner's claim on the tenant's sales; , namely,
Now ask what happens when S i (t) ≥S i . In this case there are three components to value:
, which is the value of tenant's default option;
is the discounted present value of sales; and
, which is the discounted present value of rents (accounting for the fact that the overage option is in the money).
This formal model makes clear that lease value and the optimal default trigger value depend on a variety of parameters. Furthermore, the model makes clear that lease value and the optimal default trigger value will move in opposite directions: when Y * * i increases,
increases as µ i , α i and k i increase, and that Y * * i decreases as σ i . We also know that as r i increases, the value of the lease decreases, causing default to become more likely. These insights serve as a basis for understanding the empirical simulations to come.
Parameterization of the Model
The exogenous variables in the model are the following: A study of retail leases might take several forms, including the pricing of leases used in community, neighborhood, regional, superregional, fashion/specialty, power, theme/festival, outlet, and lifestyle centers. This paper studies one of these forms viz. neighborhood centers.
We take a representative neighborhood center from a large institutional real estate owner and investor. The center has 34 tenants. The tenant mix is: 2 anchor tenants and 32 nonanchors (see below). We parameterize our model to match this center's lease terms and sales information. This adds a degree of realism to the analysis.
The parameter µ i is set equal to 3%; our best guess on the nominal growth in retail sales.
θ i is of no real import because µ i − θ i is what matters in the model; so a set of µ and θ's can be selected to be consistent with any value of V . We set θ i = 0.
The discount rate r i and risk premium p i are set to match the survey data reported in Korpacz, a quarterly survey of real estate investors concerning office, retail, apartment, and industrial returns. We set r i = 8% and p i = 1%, for an overall (unlevered) required return of 9%. (As an aside, Shilling (2003) notes that there seems to be a significant equity risk premium puzzle in real estate. Here the inclusion of the term p i helps to explain why this premium might exist, at least for retail properties, that is.) We set the valuation multiple k i = 2. This valuation multiple is consistent with those derived from market transactions as reported by Kozloff (2005) .
The remaining parameter values -Q i and
and γ ji , α, β i , andS, and S i (0) -are discussed in more detail in the next two sections.
Estimating the Stochastic Sales Externalities among Retail Tenants

Estimation Model
This section deals with the estimation of the stochastic sales externalities (ρ ji ) between tenants. Assume that retailers fall into two categories, anchor and nonanchor tenants. A linear time trend specification for identifying the stochastic component of sales (per square foot) for retailers that are anchor tenants is
and that for nonanchor tenants is
where f 1 and f 2 are fixed effects dummies (that take the value 1 for anchor tenant j and 0 otherwise), 
respectively.
Our first test is to test if equation (14) applies to both anchor tenants j = 1, 2, or whether two different models should be used. For this test, we will construct a Chow test. We first estimate (14) separately, once using only the data for anchor tenant j = 1 and the other for using the data for anchor tenant j = 2. We then pool our data into one set and estimate equation (14) 
where (t) ). This allows us to solve for ρ 1 and ρ 2 (the extent to which higher anchor tenant sales will result in higher non-anchor tenant sales).
An immediate consequence of this result is that we can use ρ 1 and ρ 2 as two alternative parameter values of the instantaneous correlation coefficient ρ ji , defined by
where dZ j and dZ i are Wiener processes in the sales functions for tenants j (anchor tenant) and i (nonanchor tenants), respectively. ρ ji is a key parameter in our analysis. We generally expect ρ ji to be positive and significant in most shopping centers (which is why the loss of a major tenant often has a big impact on a shopping center). Below, we report on our estimates of ρ 1 and ρ 2 .
Empirical Illustration
The data used to estimate (14) and (15) Using this data, we have estimated the linear time trend models as specified in (14) and (15): for the two largest tenants in the sample (which we take to be the anchor tenants), and Tests are conducted to determine whether inside these two groups the tenants are different, and whether across these two groups the tenants are different.
for all other tenants (which are taken to be nonanchor tenants). There is not much point of grouping the data in other ways, given that we are using a small sample. Plus, we don't mean to misrepresent ourselves here. The basic objective is simply to come up with a "ball park"
estimate of the stochastic sales externalities among retail tenants in a shopping center. We can always experiment a little with higher or lower values of this parameter.
In table 2, we show the results of estimating (14) and (15) . The central parameters of interest are the root MSEs reported in column 1 and 2 (which are the standard deviations of the error terms σ( a i (t)) and σ( b (t)) in (14) and (15) Table 2 : OLS estimates. Dependent variable is ln(S i (t)/Q i ). S i (t) = retail sales for tenant i. Q i = size of tenant i in square feet. f 1 and f 2 are fixed effects dummies for anchor tenant 1 and 2. x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 are tenant size dummy variables equal to 1 when Q i for tenant i is below 2,000 square feet, between 2,000 and 4,000 square feet, and above 4,000 square feet, respectively. t is a time trend variable. W is a seasonal dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 in December and 0 otherwise. t-statistics for estimated parameters are presented in parameters. Root MSE = root mean squared error. R 2 = the ratio of the explained variation to the total variation. used here are monthly, and monthly data are more volatile than annual averages.
The time trend coefficients in table 2 vary between 0.0045 and 0.0061. This suggests an annualized growth rate in sales of between 5.3 and 7.4%. However, this effect seems weak (especially for anchor tenants). This may be attributable to the macroeconomic environment during the period we investigate.
We now use these residuals to estimate equation (16 a j (t) for j = 1, 2 = residual from equation (14) . t-statistics for estimated parameters are presented in parameters. Root MSE = root mean squared error. R 2 = the ratio of the explained variation to the total variation.
The R 2 for this regression is 0.02, which is quite low, but not unexpectedly so (given that we are regressing a residual on residuals). The coefficients on for an anchor tenant. The fat tails are associated with dependence on ρ ji . We find that the consequences of ignoring this externality effect are enormous. The reason is simply that as ρ ji approaches zero, the distribution of S i (t) for nonanchor tenants approaches a lognormal distribution (and this will seriously bias any estimates made of the risk premium p i ).
Specification of Production Parameters and Lease Contract Terms
There are eight remaining exogenous variables that need to be specified: the four produc- 
applies for all t, we can substitute the value S i (0) for
, and plug this result back into our model; thereby eliminating the specifica-
The four lease contract terms α i , β i ,S, and S i (0) are chosen to be consistent with the data. We set α i = $30 per square foot, β i = 0.07,S = $400 per square foot, and S i (0) = $300 per square foot for percentage rent contracts. The simulation model is then coded with the demand shock parameters, the rate of economic depreciation, the initial sales level, the discount rate and risk premium, the liquidation value, and an assumed value of V = $265 per square foot and solved for an equivalent fixed rent for a pure fixed rent contract. The solution was $40.26 per square assuming a nonexistent probability of default.
Some Simulation Results
Here we present a number of simulations to illustrate the basic workings of the model. What is also interesting about figure 3 is that it offers a somewhat latent role for percentage of sales rentals: namely, to offset the negative value to center owners of the tenant's option to default. Figure 4 depicts the value of a shopping center V as a function of volatility σ i . Shopping center value V for a pure fixed rent contract assuming a nonexistent probability of default is unaffected by a change in volatility σ i . Here we imagine a world, where tenants are subject to resource balance and participation constraints. Also, if tenants were to default on a retail lease, we imagine a world where they make a large buyout payment to the center owner. Figure 5 gives the results of how shopping center value V varies with sales percentage rate β i and sales threshold levelS i , holding all else equal. The results here are interesting. Owing to a change in both β i andS i , we find that shopping center value V decreases as both β i and
Increase in Sales Percentage Rate
Increase in Volatility
Increase in Sales Percentage Rate and Sales Threshold Level
We would anticipate that an increase in β i should raise V by raising the value of the overage option (as shown in figure 3 ). However, whenS i increases as well, or when the overage option is way out-of-the-money, an increase in β i can affect the tenant's default option more than the overage option, thereby causing property values to fall.
As a result a nontrivial rent increase would be needed to keep V from falling. Hence, in this case base and sales percentage rents may move positively together, and not negatively as others have suggested. 
Increase in Sales Drift Term and Discount Rates
Here we simulate how property capitalization rates vary with discount rates r i and growth in sales µ i . The results are illustrated in figure 6 . This figure is drawn assuming that as µ i goes up, r i goes up, but not by much. All other variables are assumed to be held constant.
The results in figure 6 are easy to explain. Generally, because of a large increase in µ i , the value of the tenant's option to default falls. This, in turn, leads to a significant increase in the value of the lease. In contrast, as r i increases, the value of the lease decreases, but only marginally so. Because the two effects are not equal, property values rise, and property capitalization rates decrease. In this way interest rates and property capitalization rates become negatively, as opposed to positively, related to each other.
We next examine how default varies with an increase in r i . In the case where tenants pay nothing but an equivalent annual base rent of $40.26 per square foot, the optimal trigger value range is between $27 and $32 per square foot (see figure 7) . Holding µ i constant, this optimal trigger value increases as r i increases. This occurs for the following reason: as r i increases, it now become more costly to delay the decision to default. This in turn raises the optimal trigger value (although the range is quite small for the parameter values used in these calculations). Next, a ceteris paribus increase in the optimal trigger value lowers the property price, which would raise the capitalization rate. So with a large enough increase in r i , interest rates and property capitalization rates could go back to being positively related to each other. Since the optimal trigger values are declining in opportunity costs, property values are even higher for pure fixed rent contracts at an annual base rent of $30 per square foot, which also makes sense. But, of course, we don't expect to observe such contracts in the market.
Increase in Stochastic Sales Externality Risk Premium
At the start of the paper we said that the usual theory for measuring the user cost of a retail lease as the sum of the expected risk-adjusted discount rate, plus the depreciation incurred and minus the rate of asset price change no longer applies. Rather the user cost needs to include a risk premium to compensate the owner/tenant for the risk that the sales externality effects at the center could dissipate or disappear over time. We also said that ignoring this risk premium may significantly overestimate shopping center value. Here we simulate this basic idea in figure 8 , where we plot shopping center value V as a function of the risk premium p i . This is a useful way to sum up the model. The key point is that V is a downward function of p i , which means that V may be significantly overstated if p i is left out of the model. Of course, another way to think about figure 8 is that shopping center owners have a natural incentive to coordinate the range of shops over the life of the shopping center in order to minimize p i (or, equivalently, to maximize V ). Furthermore, this occurs irrespective of a pure fixed or percentage rent contract. The counter argument is that shopping center owners have some influence over tenant revenues because they control both tenant mix and location within the center, and some tenant mixes/positions provide more synergy and positive externalities than others. Hence, tieing the shopping center owner lease payment to the performance of their tenants encourages the owner to maximize total sales within the center. These latter models, however, do not allow for a default option. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a general formulation for valuing a retail shopping center under uncertainty. We then analyzed the effects of changes in sales percentage rates, uncertainty, sales threshold levels, sales drift terms, discount rates, and risk premia on valuation.
Our model differs from previous studies in a number of ways. Previous studies in the literature are concerned either with inter-store externalities (and with showing that center owners need to allocate as much as 60% of the space at the center to large major retailers at low rents in order to maximize total revenues at the center), or with the pricing of retail leases in a framework in which sales follow a stochastic process. These models typically ignore feedback effects, such as the loss of a major tenant (or a decline in the tenant's customer drawing power) on sales, occupancy rates, and rent levels of the other tenants. We in this paper are concerned with an environment in which sales are stochastic; rents are set in a competitive market; tenants confer a positive externality on each other; and in which defaults can occur. We then use the model to show that the usual certainty theory for measuring the user cost of a retail lease as the sum of the expected risk-adjusted discount rate, plus the depreciation incurred and minus the rate of asset price change no longer applies; instead, one needs to discount at a slightly higher discount rate to compensate the owner/tenant for the risk that the sales externality effects at the center could dissipate or disappear over time.
Several other features of the above theory are perhaps worthy of notice. First, ignoring these feedback effects means that shopping center valuations are perhaps too high and property capitalization rates are too low. Second, it is a feature of the theory that a percentage rent clause is of positive value to a shopping center owner, but negative to a tenant. It is also a feature of the theory that the tenant's embedded default option is of positive value to the tenant, but negative to the shopping center owner. Generally, we find that these two options offset one another, thereby offering a perhaps somewhat latent role for percentage of sales rentals: to offset the negative value to center owners of the tenant's embedded default option.
It is also a feature of the theory that shopping center owners have a natural incentive to coordinate the merchandise mix of the shops over the life of the shopping center in order to minimize the value of the tenant's embedded default option. This is an important point, a point that has gone unnoticed.
Even though the model is relatively simple, it helps to explain a variety of phenomena ranging from an increase in sales volatility may reduce, rather than increase, shopping center 
